Abstract-Integration of distributed energy resources has been significantly increasing in the electric power grid. One of the predominant renewable energy sources, wind energy, possess a significant challenge for grid operations, due to its intermittency, uncertainity, and variability. In changing operating conditions with wind uncertainity, part of wind may need to be curtailed for the safe utilization of the transmission system. In order to minimize the wind power curtailment and to keep the power flow on a transmission line under limits, a cyber resilient distributed remedial action scheme (DRAS) is developed in this paper. The remedial action scheme (RAS) is formulated as an optimization problem, considering the real-power flow constraints of the transmission lines and given wind variability. In this paper, DRAS is developed to operate even with failures in the computing nodes to make it cyber-resilient. Distributed simplex algorithm is used for optimization in the distributed RAS. The DRAS is implemented in a decentralized platform called Resilient Information Architecture Platform for Smart Grid to enable cyber resiliency of DRAS. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated through offline simulations of the New England 39-bus system and online simulations of IEEE 14-bus test system. A cyber-physical testbed utilizing real time digital simulator, phasor measurement units, and BeagleBones has been used for the online simulation and validation of the developed cyber-resilient RAS.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HERE has been a renewed interest among both the system operators and wind power producers on wind curtailment as a solution to the transmission overload problems caused by the increased wind penetration. Curtailment is a reduction in the output of a generator from what it could otherwise produce given available resources, typically on an involuntary basis [1] . Owing to technical and economic constraints [2] , excessive portions of the wind generation are curtailed and hence wasted [1] . Curtailment of wind can lead to many undesirable consequences. Primarily, it results in useful energy being wasted. Second, revenue of the wind industry can be reduced significantly, which puts wind projects at risk of not meeting their debt obligations or reducing the amount of debt that the project's cash flows can support. Hence, there is a need to minimize wind curtailment, such that line limits are not violated.
Wind energy curtailment have been studied in detail in literature. In [3] , the wind curtailment estimation effects of natural interyearly wind profile variability, system demand-profile/fuelprice parameter uncertainty, and minimum system inertial constraints are studied in detail. In [4] and [5] , storage-based method is suggested to reduce the wind curtailment. An optimal wind power curtailment strategy considering operation capacity credit is proposed in [6] . In [7] , a combinatorial planning model to maximize wind power utilization is studied. A day-ahead operational planning methodology for deciding location and the amount of the wind power curtailment is presented in [8] to support the wind power curtailment decision-making by system operators. Reducing curtailed wind energy through energy storage and demand response is studied in [9] . These schemes for minimizing wind curtailment are mostly applicable for planning stages and requires capital investment. Such methods may work for certain operating conditions and have to be redesigned for other. Hence, it is required to develop a measurement-based schemes for minimum wind curtailment to adapt to changing operating conditions given wind uncertainity.
In many cases, curtailments are implemented manually whereby grid operators call wind facilities to issue curtailment directives. Manual curtailment instructions are used by Salt River Project, Tucson Electric, New England Independent System Operator, PacifiCorp, and Mid Continent Independent System Operator [1] . PacifiCorp's generation center can manually control wind output levels for wind facilities they own.
Majority of the utilities, including the Electric Reliability Council of Texas have realized the importance of the optimal and automatic curtailment. Manual curtailment processes for wind has generally extended curtailment periods due to the time required to implement curtailment and reluctance to release units from curtailment orders. Automatic communication procedures can speed the implementation of curtailment orders and reduce overall curtailment time. Moreover, automated wind curtailments can also relieve the system stress faster, thereby ensuring better reliability of the power supply.
Remedial action scheme (RAS) provides automatic control action with high impact on the system performance. The RAS is becoming an attractive mitigation approach to maintain transmission system reliability and stability [10] . The RAS under consideration is related to thermal overload problems, which requires the time bound to be in the range of several seconds or minutes.
Recently, more and more information and communication technologies have been deployed in the power system for maintaining the reliability of power grid and increasing the integration of renewable energy. RAS, which is designed for detecting the abnormal system conditions and maintaining the system stability, has been widely used in the power system operation and control [11] . There are several RAS, which have already been implemented in industry [12] - [17] . Based on the literature survey, the following are key issues identified in the existing automated RAS approaches.
1) Most of the existing approaches are not resilient to faults in the computing node or in communication architecture. The curtailment decisions are taken at a single control node. Failure of the central node may prove catastrophic to the system operations unless backed up by redundant computing nodes. 2) Most of the RAS that exist today are hard coded and does not provide any flexibility for frequently changing operating conditions. RAS developed for one operating condition may not be suitable when the system conditions change. Operating conditions in a power system change abruptly. Hence, a response-based RAS, which is adaptive, suitable for changing conditions is needed. Based on the special features, RAS can be used for wind generation curtailment. In authors' previous paper [18] , a RAS is developed to minimize the wind generation curtailment and maintain the transmission line flows at the same time. RAS in [18] is based on the dc power flow and linear programming. In [19] , a new RAS is developed to maximize the wind energy integration without compromising the security and reliability of the power system based on specific utility requirements. A new distributed linear state estimation (DLSE) was also developed to provide the fast and accurate input data for the proposed RAS. A distributed computational architecture was designed to guarantee the robustness of the cyber system to support RAS and DLSE implementation. In [20] , a cyber resilient RAS was developed. The RAS was formulated as an optimization problem, considering the real-power flow constraints of the transmission lines and voltage constraints of the transmission buses. RAS was developed to operate even under limited failures in the computing nodes to make it cyber-resilient RAS. Current research work encapsulates the ideas of resiliency from [18] to [20] . In this paper, the following items are proposed. 1) We propose an RAS with distributed optimization formulation.
2) The proposed distributed RAS is implemented on a distributed computing platform to evaluate the performance and the resiliency to various failures. 3) In addition, due to the large communication and data requirement of RAS, communication failure may cause serious effect on the RAS operation. In order to overcome this problem, communication failure tolerance is also designed for the developed RAS. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) To propose a robust computing fault-tolerant distributed RAS (DRAS) based on distributed simplex optimization method. 2) To implement the proposed DRAS on a real-time distributed platform called "Resilient Information Architecture Platform for Smart Grid" (RIAPS) [21] . 3) To validate the algorithm on a real-time testbed incorporating real time digital simulator (RTDS), distributed controllers, and hardware phasor measurement units (PMUs). 4) To analyze the effect of various cyber failures on the performance of the DRAS.
II. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY OF THE PROPOSED DECENTRALIZED REMEDIAL SCHEME
This section presents the various steps in the operation of the proposed DRAS. The overall decentralized remedial action scheme (DRAS) is illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2 . The high level architectures of various building blocks in the proposed RAS is explained in author's previous work [20] . 
A. Data Aggregator
The proposed RAS uses local and remote measurements of voltage and current phasors measured at each substation. The temperature and wind speed are also required for the proposed RAS. The topology processing is carried out based on the breaker status. The primary source of voltage and current phasors are field sensors like PMUs, digital fault recorders (DFR), and remote terminal units (RTU). The PMUs and DFRs transmit phasor data in a periodic fashion at the rate of 1 phasor per second. The RTUs transmit the voltage magnitude and power flow measurements at the rate of 1 set of measurements per second. The weather measurements are periodically updated every 10 min. The data form the PMUs and DFRs are time stamped using Global Positioning System at the source, while the measurements from the RTUs are time stamped by the data acquisition module. The physical interface for data inputs from PMUs, DFRs, RTU, and weather measurements are Ethernet ports. The protocol for input data for PMU and DFR measurements is C37.118 over TCP layer and that of RTUs and weather sensors is DNP3.
The measured phasor data, RTU data, and weather sensor data is sent to the data aggregator through a substation LAN. This module consists of a phasor data concentrator (PDC). It time aligns the data and the processed data is sent to computing nodes for determining the control actions through a WAN.
B. Distributed Linear State Estimator
The DLSE component is responsible for finding the results of state estimation. Each DLSE component has access to part of the readings of the power injection bus, which it uses to perform state estimation. The DLSE performs state estimation on the readings from the buses that are part of its group, but also requires some readings from other groups to fully perform the calculation. To get these readings, the DLSE component also subscribes to the messages of the data aggregator components from which it requires readings. The DLSE component calculates the estimated values of the readings from these groups and sends them out as a message to the DRAS component.
C. Dynamic Line Rating Component
The dynamic line ratings (DLR) specify the value of the current without overloading the transmission lines at a given temperature and wind speed. The increase in the ambient temperature reduces the DLR, whereas increase in wind speed increases the DLR. The DLR actor uses weather data from the data acquisition actor, which are required to estimate the DLR based on IEEE Std 738-2006. The DLR actor calls estimate DLR component to obtain the DLR. This component uses time synchronization service to broadcast the time validity of the estimated DLR.
D. Distributed RAS Component
The DRAS module is responsible for receiving estimated readings from the DLSE, detecting overloads, and calculating a curtailment value if an overload is found. The DRAS component is shown in more detail in Fig. 2 . The application consists of multiple groups, and all of them communicate intermediate results with each other to solve the distributed optimization problem. These groups can be dynamically changed based on the user's requirements. More details of the mathematical algorithm is described in the subsequent sections.
The successful termination of the optimization will result in vector solution variables. This component also translates the solution into required control action and uses the device interface service for execution to the local actuator.
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
This section presents an overview of the mathematical modeling of the DRAS and the solution algorithm for the optimization model of the RAS. The DRAS model is systematically derived from the centralized formulation. The objective of the proposed RAS is to reduce the wind energy curtailment, and also avoid overloads on the transmission line. This problem can be mathematically formulated as [18] Max
In this equation, the power generation for the ith wind farm is represented by P Gen i . The number of wind farms installed is represented by N. The wind farm connection status for the ith wind farm is represented by
The dc power flow equations can be the following:
The line rating on the ith transmission line is represented by LR i . P ij is the flow in the line from bus i to bus j. θ i is the angle at bus i. By converting the above equations into a standard linear programming format, this optimization problem can be solved. The optimization problem (1)- (4) is convex, since the objective function and the constraints are convex in nature. This is by virtue of the dc formulation. Considering the line flow limits, the objective function (1) can be written as follows:
It is required to develop a decentralized, fast, fault-tolerant RAS.
The proposed RAS logic is designed to be implemented in multiple controllers at electric substations connected to data sources in a decentralized manner. This allows applications to perform calculations continually in an optimal layout for data delivery and initiating an emergency control action. It provides further reliability over the failure of a single centralized calculation node. One of the main objectives of such an architecture is to ensure reliability, in a case of any node/link failure in the distributed framework. When the centralized RAS is utilized in the larger system, the simplex method may be time consuming, which may go over the time threshold. In order to shorten the computation time of RAS, DRAS is developed by utilizing distributed simplex method. For DRAS, the whole system is divided in K groups. In each group, the substation with most computation resource is selected as the group leader. Comparing with RAS running in the control center, DRAS operates in each group leader. In addition, each group has their own constraints, which are the transmission line rating in each group, but all the groups share the same objective function. The mathematical formulation for the distributed RAS is shown below
Based on the above equations, the simplex tableau can be built for each group. Since all the groups share the same objective function, the last row of all the simplex tableaus is the same. Then, the distributed simplex method is performed as following steps.
1) In each group, the pivot row and corresponding row indicator need to be found out. Then, each group leader shares its own pivot row and corresponding row indicator with all other group leaders. 2) Once the all the group leaders receive the pivot information from the rest of group leader, the smallest row indicator can be found out. Then, the pivot row, which is corresponding with the smallest row indicator, is utilized to do the matrix row operation in all the groups. 3) Since all the groups utilize the same pivot row to do the matrix row operation, the last row of each group is still the same. If there are still negative column indicators in the last row, step should go back to step 1 and go through all the steps again until the all the column indicators are nonnegative. If all the column indicators are nonnegative. The final simplex tableaus for all the groups are built. The optimal value is the number in the last row and last column. The optimal system states X can be calculated by the same method with simplex method. The advantages of DRAS is not only the high operation speed, but also the fault tolerant capability. If one of the group leaders meets the failure, the whole DRAS will continue running and calculate the optimal solutions only with a fewer constraints, since some of the constraints are lost due to the group leader failure. For the centralized RAS, the single point of failure can stop the service of centralized RAS. In order to solve this standard linear programming problem, distributed simplex method [22] is utilized. In order to convert the inequality constraints into equality constraints. A nonnegative variable called slack variable is added to each inequality constraints.
Depending on the distributed algorithm in development, a variety of different things can happen to the data after its made available to its local substation computer. First and foremost, data may be analyzed for importance, potentially shortening the caching period or deleting unnecessary and redundant data. This is not always possible to deduce on a local scale though, so some or all data may be forwarded onto a computational leader. The nodes selected to aggregate data from multiple (or all) other nodes are called computational leaders, they are often selected based on processing capability, but a variety of metrics can be used to varying effect, including physical grid placement, or mean network latency. These group leaders can work on data from their subsection of substations, working and share data with other leaders as necessary, to optimize the amount of stored data and work any one node is required to perform.
A set of algorithms can be used and adopted for different use cases to ensures replication of the data between multiple computational leader nodes, as well as handling their selection and coordination in failure conditions. The RAS program uses this data to monitor the system status and calculates the appropriate control action if an overload problem is forming or occurring. Control actions will be sent through communication network back to master PC. In the master PC, our self-designed communication program receives the control action and send it into RSCAD to control the breaker or wind farm output in the simulated power system. In a real-world implementation, these control actions would be routed directly to the appropriate windfarm.
IV. DISTRIBUTED SIMPLEX METHOD
In order to solve this standard linear programming problem, simplex method is utilized. The previous format of the linear programming problem can be simplified as finding X to maximum f (X) = c 1 x 1 + c 2 x 2 + · · · + c n x n subject to X ≥ 0 and A * X ≤ b. In order to convert the inequality constraints into equality constraints. A nonnegative variable called slack variable is added to each inequality constraints. Thus, all the constraints can be rewritten as follows: 
. . . Once the simplex tableau is built, the step of simplex method is shown as follows.
1) Except the last two numbers in the last row, the rest of numbers in the last row are called column indicators. The column, which contains the most negative column indicator, is the pivot column. For example, if C n is the largest number in (c 1 , c n ),column n is the pivot column. 2) For each positive number in the pivot column, the row indicator is calculated by dividing the last column number, which is in the same row of the positive number in the pivot column, by the positive number in the pivot column. For example, if column n is pivot column and a m n a is a positive number, the row indicator of row m is b m /a m n . Then, the row with the smallest row indicator is the pivot row.
3) The number in the pivot column and pivot row is the pivot.
The next step is to divide the pivot row by pivot, which changes the pivot to 1. Then, the matrix row operation is utilized to change all other number in the pivot column to 0. 4) If there are still negative column indicators in the last row, step should go back to step 1 and go through all the steps again until the all the column indicators are nonnegative.
If all the column indicators are nonnegative. The final simplex tableau is built. The optimal value is the number in the last row and last column. 5) When the final simplex tableau is built, all the positive column indicators represent zero variables. For example, if the number in the ith column and last row is positive, then x i = 0. After finding all the zero variables, the final simplex tableau can be solved to find out the optimal system states X. In this RAS, dc power flow-based convex optimization is utilized to guarantee the convergence, but the transmission line rating utilizes MVA as a unit. In order to mitigate the effect of the difference between real power and complex power, the margin factor m is involved in this algorithm. m is ranging from 0.9 to 0.95. Note that most of the utility around the world utilizes dc power flow-based optimization and this work is based on a realexisting industry case study. This RAS is designed for both the modes as discussed earlier and to provide the optimal solutions to solve the overload conditions and minimize the wind power curtailment.
Since RAS provides automatic control action with high impact on system performance, the input data to response-based RAS must be processed to remove noise and error, and to identify a possible malicious attack. In addition, RAS should be very fast to timely mitigate thermal overload, voltage instability, and transient instability problems. Most of the RAS should take control actions within a couple of seconds. However, traditional centralized state estimation (TCSE) only runs every 2-15 min. The operation speed of TCSE cannot meet the requirements of RAS. DLSE proposed in [18] is utilized to provide the fast and safe input data for RAS.
V. RIAPS: FUNCTIONALITIES AND CAPABILITIES
The robustness or cyber-resiliency is defined as the ability to successfully perform even with limited number of cyber failures, such as communication latency, computational node failures, communication link failures caused by cyber events, or possible cyber attack. If the leader is detected as faulty, then a secondary backup computational node leader can take over to run algorithms. Requirements for this include the following: 1) Confirmation of data consistency between the leader and backup node is performed to deduce if a failure may be occurring in the leader or backup, in which case a seamless fall-over is initiated. a) If the status of leaders communication channel cannot be checked, nodes of the group should vote on switching to the backup. b) If the fault is detected on the leaders communication channel, the backup leader can announce to the members that its the new leader. 2) In the case of any leadership changes, a new leader election should occur to ensure two leaders are receiving all the data. Distributed computing architecture inherently provide computational robustness due to redundancy in the computing nodes. Middleware architecture automates the process of computational node failure and transferring the computational responsibilities to the backup leader. The applications need to be designed by segmenting the problem across multiple groups and leaders to take full advantage of the distributed computing. There is a definite overhead latency for messages needed to run liveliness systems, voting, and leader data consistency checking.
A specialized hardware and software framework is required to implement such an application with distributed components. This application depends largely on communication and coordination among the local sensing and control algorithms, and also attempts to evenly distribute computational load among ll computing nodes, and requires the application components to be fault tolerant. We use the RIAPS platform to implement the RAS with all these features.
The State Estimation Algorithm and the RAS algorithm are implemented as distributed algorithms to reduce computational complexity and increase resiliency. These distributed algorithm require multiple computational units that perform unique functions. These computational units constantly communicate to each other to distribut the computational load adequately, and coordinate to carry out their shared function. These services also need to be continuously monitored to validate their operation, and overall operation of the system must continue in case of errors or failures of any components in the system. All these communication, coordination, and resiliency services have to work together for the system to function properly in all conditions. All these challenges are addressed using the RIAPS [21] .
To realize the proposed distributed implementation of the RAS, the power network is divided into three groups. Each group has access to some local measurements. The functions of each group are abstracted using into an actor called GroupActor. Each GroupActor consists of three components components, a DataProvider, StatEstimator, and a RASGroup. The logical architecture of a node in the application is shown in Fig. 3 .
The various software components of the application and their functions are described below.
Resiliency is another important goal of this distributed application. The application is made to be fault tolerant by using a heartbeat mechanism. Each node in the system is assigned another node as a secondary node, or backup node. This backup node periodically monitors it's primary node to make sure it is operational. When a backup node detects a failure, it takes over operation of the primary node along with it's own operation. For example, consider node #2 as a primary node, and node #3 as its secondary backup. Node #2 continuously sends heartbeat messages to node #3 while it is operational. If node #2 loses power and fails, node #3 will not receive heartbeat messages from node #2. After a certain timeout, it determines that node #2 has failed, and performs the same computation as node alongside its own computation. Each node in the system is assigned a unique backup node.
The application is made to be resilient to communication failures and node failures. In case the entire node fails, the backup node performs both the communication and computational operations of the node that failed. The operation of the DataProvider, StateEstimator, and RASGroup components must be taken up by the backup node. However, communication failures may also occur due to disconnected cables, faulty configurations, or other network issues. In this case, the node can still carry out its fair share of state estimation operations even though it cannot get data. To allow this to happen, each component in a node monitors the same component on another node. If the DataProvider in group #1 loses its connection from local PMUs, the DataProvider in group #2 determines that the DataProvider in group #1 has stopped working, then group #2 reinstantiates the connections that were originally part of group #1. In this case, the StateEstimator and RASGroup component in group #1 is still active and evenly distributes the computational load.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed algorithm was tested on three tests systems: IEEE 14-bus system, IEEE 39-bus system, and RTE France system. The results are shown for offline and real-time simulations in two test systems as described in the following subsections.
A. Offline Simulation
The proposed method is validated through offline simulations on IEEE 39-bus system shown in Fig. 4 .
In the test system, there are wind farms at the buses 2, 8, 12, 15, 16, 21, and 26. To simulate an overload on the transmission lines, wind generation outputs of wind farms 15 and 16 are increased to 600 MW from 300 MW. Table I shows the generations for the wind farms at the base case and the stressed case.
The optimal wind curtailment RAS problem is solved using both centralized [(7)-(11)] and distributed formulations. For the distributed case, the overall objective function is divided into four objective functions, corresponding to each area and constraint equations are defined for each area. In addition to these, there are additional coupling constraints. The distributed simplex method [22] is used to solve the distributed optimization problem. The algorithm is implemented in MATLAB. Table I shows the line power flows in the overloaded transmission lines with no RAS (NRAS), with centralized RAS (CRAS), and distributed RAS (DRAS). It is seen that the with both the CRAS and DRAS, there is a 100% reduction in the line overloads. The line power flows under CRAS and DRAS are almost same. This is because the solution of the optimization problem for CRAS and DRAS are almost same. This is because the overall centralized objective function is convex and hence the distributed formulation gives almost the same result as that of the centralized problem. The total wind power curtailed in the case of CRAS is 531 MW and for DRAS it is 535 MW. There is a slight increase in the total wind power curtailed in the case of DRAS
B. Real-Time Simulations
In order to test the performance and analyze the communication requirement of RAS, this cyber-physical real-time testbed is utilized. In a simple test case, each simulated substation gets its own computation device (node), representing a real-time automation controller or substation PC. RTDS, simulating the grid TABLE I  WIND POWER GENERATIONS UNDER BASE CASE AND  STRESSED CASE SCENARIOS   TABLE II  POWER FLOW IN OVERLOADED TRANSMISSION LINES WITH NO RAS, CENTRALIZED RAS, AND DISTRIBUTED RAS network, is continually producing measurements for all buses selected at a substation. IEEE 14-bus system is considered as shown in Fig. 6 and divided into four groups. It is assumed that the buses in the test system are equipped with PMUs, which are used as sensors, to read data and send the measurements to the controllers. The setup uses a total of nine PMUs, one of which is an SEL hardware PMU, and others are GTNET PMUs. Each controller connects to three of these PMUs from which it reads and parses C37.118 packets.
The implementation of the controller is carried out by using BeagleBone Blacks (BBBs). The setup uses three BBBs to carry out the control functions. These BBBs run distributed algorithms and coordinate with each other to function as a single control system. The BBBs are connected to RTDS and the PMUs using Ethernet cables. IEEE C37.118 protocol is used to communicate with the PMUs. Control commands are sent back to RTDS as text strings over its ListenOnPort interface using standard TCP sockets. The architecture of the testbed is shown in Fig. 5 .
The algorithm was validated through extensive testing with both offline and real-time simulations carried out on IEEE 14-bus system. The application is tested for resiliency in case of node failures and communication failures. For the real-time simulation, distributed simplex method is run on the BBs. The modified IEEE 14-bus system is shown in Fig. 6 . It includes three wind farm on bus 2, bus 9, and bus 11. An overload in the transmission line from bus 7 to bus 9 was created by increasing the generation of the wind farm at bus 9 from 60 to 100 MW.
The advantage of a dynamically calculated curtailment values is that it can be responsive in real time to line rating changes caused by changing weather conditions. In the online test system, we use a single static set of line ratings for demonstrating a simple case of exceeding the transmission line limits. These ratings could be recalculated every cycle, derived from either weather conditions, predominantly temperature, or could be computed using inputs from power donut sensors installed at transmission lines for even more precise real-time line ratings [23] .
Using the established system and line ratings, an overload condition occurs at the transmission line connected to generator 6, and curtailment action occurs. Generation is curtailed from it's previous generation value down to 81.57% of it's maximum possible generation based on the wind energy available. In larger connected systems, results may instead partially curtail multiple wind farms, but in the current test system, optimal curtailment results in only minor generation shedding, to be sufficient to protect the transmission lines. Following cases have been studied using the developed cyber-physical testbed. Case C, which depicts a scenario in which the primary leader node fails before control action is taken shows that the flow is still maintained within the limit same as with Case B. In this case, the backup node quickly comes into the action, providing the resiliency to the node failure.
1) Case A: The voltage and current measurements are obtained from the RTDS using GTNET PMUs. The PMU data is sent to SEL PDC and PDC sends the synchrophasor data based on C37.118 protocol to NS-3 simulated communication network. Without any RAS deployed, the transmission line from bus-6 to bus-7 carries a real power of 111 MW, where as the capacity of the line is 95 MW, resulting in an overload condition. Based on the traditional protection method, the wind farm generation, which is 180 MW, on bus 6 will be shed in order to solve this overload problem. It can protect the transmission line from the overload condition, but it sheds a large amount of renewable energy. In order to maximize the usage of the wind power, the proposed RAS is implemented.
2) Case B: Since both the primary leader and backup leader are healthy in this case, the measurements are received by both the nodes. The primary leader runs the RAS algorithm, and utilizing this data, the primary leader calculates the curtailment if an overload occurs in the system. The control action thus calculated will be sent through NS-3 simulated communication network back to master PC. In the master PC, the self-designed communication program receives the control action and sends it into RSCAD to control the breaker or wind farm output in the simulated power system.
3) Case C: In this simulation case, the primary computational leader node fails. The backup leader detects this failure. For this simple case, both leaders are running in the MATLAB parallel cluster, and failures are detected directly from it's interface. Upon a process death, the backup begins sending back the control signals to the power system, which in this case, is the RTDS.
In tandem with a primary leader, backups can be selected to also receive the same set of the data for processing at the same time as the leader. Results from backup leaders can be ignored unless a fault is detected in the primary leader. This is important for quick recovery in a failure condition, as the backup already has a complete set of data and a calculated result, no rollback or redelivery of data is necessitated to continue operations. In addition, when there is sufficiently low network latency, and excess time before new sensor data, backup leaders can compare their results with the primary leader, creating a sort of triple modular redundancy, only reporting the leaders result if all backups came to the same conclusion. This also protects against specific link faults, where a node may be unable to deliver its data to the primary leader, but still, can send to one or more backup leader nodes.
Thus, even in a case of node failure, the proposed scheme is capable of ensuring the resiliency, thus, avoiding any catastrophic effects on the power system.
4) Case D:
In this case, processes are running in standalone machines, and the communication link at the primary leader fails as shown in Fig. 7 . Instead of utilizing parallel processing code, liveliness is detected using a heartbeat process, where a call and response occurs between the backup and primary node continually. Upon failed communication, using reasonable timeout thresholds, if the backup node believes control action should be taken, it will begin communication with the simulated system as the primary control node.
Since a process cannot be certain if and where a fault has occurred, in a larger network of collaborating nodes, a Phi Accrual Failure Detector [24] is utilized to provide all nodes a suspicion level of failure for the primary and backup leader. Upon this 
TABLE III LINE POWER FLOWS UNDER VARIOUS SIMULATION CASES
failure likelihood value passing a defined threshold in any one node, a vote is initiated to decide on switching to the backup, and potentially to define a new backup at the same time.
5) Case E:
In this case, the distributed RAS algorithm is deployed on the BBB devices. All nodes receive information from some of the PMUs in the system and runs the RAS algorithm. The nodes in the system handle different parts of the computation and communicate intermediate results with each other. This scenario assumes that all nodes are operational. 6) Case F: In this case, one of the nodes running the DRAS algorithm fails. As shown in Fig. 8 , node #2 stops working. When node #2 fails, node #3 stops receiving heartbeat messages from node #2. After a certain time, node #3 runs the operations of node #2 in parallel with its own computation. It reinstates all connections with the PMUs, which were connected to the failed node, and runs the algorithm again as in the normal case. Table III shows the power flow in the overloaded line for the following:
1) Without any RAS.
2) RAS with healthy node.
3) With failed leader node. 4) With the communication at the leader node failing. 5) Distributed RAS with all nodes operational. 6) Distributed RAS with one node failing. It is seen from the table that without RAS, there is an overload in the line. However, with the proposed RAS, the overload in the line is alleviated and the flow is within its limits. Case C, which depicts a scenario in which the primary leader node fails, the flow is again well within the limit and is same as Case B.
In this case, the backup node quickly comes into the action, providing the resiliency to the node failure. For Case D as well, the performance of the RAS action is minimally affected when a communication link fails, only adding more delay to ensure that the link failure is not just a dropped packet.
Table III also shows the round trip time taken for the RAS action for all the four cases. Time taken for the case of link failures is slightly larger than the case where all the nodes and communication links are healthy. This is because, there is some time delay to ensure reliable detection of the cyber failures.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel fault tolerant computing architecture is developed and implemented using RIAPS for cyber-resilient DRAS to avoid the transmission lines overloads while minimizing the wind curtailment. The DRAS is modeled as an distributed optimization problem, solved using distributed simplex method. The proposed method is validated using the New England 39-bus system and compared with the centralized RAS.
Another contribution of this paper is to develop a cyberphysical test bed to validate the proposed cyber-resilient algorithm in real time. The distributed RAS is implemented in RIAPS platform and validated on a real-time testbed consisting of RTDS, PMUs and BeagleBones. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated through online simulations on IEEE 14-bus test system under various cyber failures. The proposed architecture is resilient to limited number of cyber node failures to guarantee reliable operation of RAS for line overloads and hence avoiding any possible cascading events in the network. Analyzing resiliency of the RAS for a cyber attack and implementing RAS operation with multiple physical faults leading to islanding will be part of the future work.
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